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(54) **TRAFFIC ENCRYPTION KEY
MANAGEMENT FOR MACHINE TO
MACHINE MULTICAST GROUP**

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H04L 29/06 (2006.01)

H04W 12/04 (2009.01)

H04W 4/08 (2009.01)

H04W 4/00 (2009.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**

CPC **H04W 12/04** (2013.01); **H04L 63/065** (2013.01); **H04L 2463/061** (2013.01); **H04W 4/005** (2013.01); **H04W 4/08** (2013.01)

(58) **Field of Classification Search**

CPC H04W 4/005; H04W 4/08

USPC 370/328; 380/31, 45

See application file for complete search history.

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(57)

ABSTRACT

A method for decrypting multicast data by a mobile station in a wireless communication system is described. The method includes receiving an identifier of a group from a base station, receiving parameters for generating a group traffic key from the base station, wherein the parameters include an authentication key for the group, a group security seed and a counter, performing a key derivation function to generate the group traffic key based on the identifier and the parameters and decrypting multicast data using the group traffic key.

8 Claims, 9 Drawing Sheets




Fig. 1




Fig. 2




Fig. 3




Fig. 4




Fig. 5




Fig. 6




Fig. 7




Fig. 8




Fig. 9




Fig. 10




Fig. 11





Fig. 12



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TRAFFIC ENCRYPTION KEY MANAGEMENT FOR MACHINE TO MACHINE MULTICAST GROUP

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is the National Stage filing under 35 U.S.C. 371 of International Application No. PCT/KR2011/009490, filed on Dec. 8, 2011, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 61/420,779, filed on Dec. 8, 2010, and U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 61/449,723, filed on Mar. 7, 2011, the contents of which are all hereby incorporated by reference herein in their entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure generally relates to a traffic encryption key management for the devices in machine to machine multicast group.

BACKGROUND ART

Protection technologies for the multimedia traffic to multiple of devices have been introduced in a wireless communication system. Recently, in machine to machine (M2M) communication environments, M2M devices tend to have a limited capability and do not consume multimedia data as traditional devices do in a general wireless communication system.

DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION

Technical Problem

In IEEE 802.16e, MBRA (Multicast and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm) for MBS (Multicast and Broadcast Service) and MTK (MBS Transport Key) based multicast traffic encryption have been defined as technologies covering multicast service for a group of devices.

The existing technologies are mainly designed for multimedia service settings. Since M2M devices have a low mobility and can operate while they belong to M2M device groups for a device management, an enhancement to the security mechanism for multicast traffic needs to be defined.

This disclosure is to provide a method for generating a traffic encryption key for M2M Device Group in M2M communication environments. This disclosure is to provide a reduced security key hierarchy for multicast data transmission in M2M environments. Also, this disclosure is to provide a method for updating a traffic encryption key when other mobile device is unsubscribed from the M2M Device Group. This disclosure is to provide a method for assigning M2M Device Group Identifier for transmitting multicast data to the devices in the M2M Device Group.

Solution to Problem

In one aspect, a method for decrypting multicast data by a mobile station in a wireless communication system is described. The method includes receiving an identifier of a group from a base station, receiving parameters for generating a group traffic key from the base station, wherein the parameters include an authentication key for the group, a group security seed and a counter, performing a key deriva-

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tion function to generate the group traffic key based on the identifier and the parameters and decrypting multicast data using the group traffic key.

This, and other aspects, can include one or more of the following features. The method further includes receiving a trigger message for updating the group traffic key from the base station, performing the key derivation function to update the group traffic key based on updated parameters in the trigger message, and decrypting the multicast data using the group traffic key updated. The updated parameters in the trigger message include the authentication key newly derived. The updated parameters in the trigger message include the group security seed is changed. The group security seed is changed when other device is unsubscribed from the group. The updated parameters in the trigger message include the counter incremented by 1. The identifier of the group is M2M (Machine to Machine) device group identifier. The method further includes transmitting, to the base station, control information indicating that M2M capability is enabled. The control information is transmitted during a basic capability negotiation procedure with the base station.

Implementations of the described techniques may include hardware, a method or process, or computer software on a computer-accessible medium.

Advantageous Effects of Invention

According to the exemplary embodiments described in this disclosure, the mobile station can participate in the multicasting group using M2M Device Group ID. The mobile station can generate and update the traffic encryption key without heavy intervention of the base station. The mobile station operating even in idle state can update the traffic encryption key.

The details of one or more implementations are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other features will be apparent from the description and drawings, and from the claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a wireless communication system.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a mobile station and a base station in the wireless communication system.

FIG. 3 shows a flow chart illustrating network entry procedures and initialization procedures in the wireless communication system.

FIG. 4 is an exemplary diagram illustrating relationship between M2M Device Group ID and M2M Device ID.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary method for assigning an M2M Device Group ID and an M2M Device ID to a M2M device during the network entry procedure.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a process for decrypting multicast data of a mobile station.

FIG. 7 shows a security key hierarchy for the traffic key.

FIG. 8 shows a flow chart of a process for providing L2 Group Security.

FIG. 9 through FIG. 12 illustrate exemplary processes for updating the group traffic key.

MODE FOR THE INVENTION

The technology described below can be used in various wireless communication systems such as code division multiple access (CDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), orthogonal

frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA), etc. The CDMA can be implemented with a radio technology such as universal terrestrial radio access (UTRA) or CDMA-2000. The TDMA can be implemented with a radio technology such as global system for mobile communications (GSM)/general packet radio service (GPRS)/enhanced data rate for GSM evolution (EDGE). The OFDMA can be implemented with a radio technology such as institute of electrical and electronics engineers (IEEE) 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802-20, evolved UTRA (E-UTRA), etc. IEEE 802.16m is an evolution of IEEE 802.16e, and provides backward compatibility with an IEEE 802.16-based system. The UTRA is a part of a universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS). 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) long term evolution (LTE) is a part of an evolved UMTS (E-UMTS) using the E-UTRA. The 3GPP LTE uses the OFDMA in downlink and uses the SC-FDMA in uplink. LTE-advance (LTE-A) is an evolution of the 3GPP LTE.

For clarity, the following description will focus on the IEEE 802.16m. However, technical features of the present invention are not limited thereto.

Wireless Communication System

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a wireless communication system. The wireless communication system is widely deployed to provide various communication services such as voice, packet data, etc. Referring to FIG. 1, the wireless communication system includes a plurality of mobile stations (MS) 100 and one or more of base stations (BS) 200. The mobile station can be fixed or mobile, and can be referred with other terminologies such as UE (User Equipment), UT (User Terminal), SS (Subscriber Station), Wireless Device and AMS (Advanced Mobile Station), etc.

The base station 200 generally indicates a fixed station communication with the mobile station 100, and the base station 200 can be referred with other terminologies such as NodeB, BTS (Base Transceiver System), Access Point, etc.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a mobile station and a base station in the wireless communication system.

The mobile station 100 includes a control unit 110, memory 120 and RF (Radio Frequency) unit 130. The mobile station 100 can include a display unit and a user interface unit as well.

The control unit 110 carries out the functions, steps and/or methods described herein. The control unit 110 can execute the functions related to the layers of radio interface protocols.

The memory 120 is connected to the control unit 110, and stores protocols and parameters for performing wireless communications. Namely, the memory 120 stores an operating system of the mobile terminal, application programs and general files.

The RF unit 130 is connected to the control unit 110 to transmit and receive radio signals.

Additionally, the display unit displays various information of the mobile station and can be implemented with well-known display elements such as LCD (Liquid Crystal Display), OLED (Organic Light Emitting Diodes), etc. The user interface unit can include well-known user interfaces such a key pad, a touch screen, etc.

The base station 200 includes a control unit 210, a memory 220 and a RF unit 230.

The control unit 210 carries out the functions, steps and/or methods described herein.

The control unit 210 can execute the functions related to the wireless communication protocol layers.

The memory 220 is connected to the control unit 210, and stores protocols and parameters for performing wireless communications.

The RF unit 230 is connected to the control unit 210 to transmit and receive radio signals.

The control units 110 and 210 can include ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit), other chipsets, logic circuits and/or data processing units. The memory 120 and 220 can include ROM (read-only memory), RAM (random access memory), flash memory, memory cards, storage media and/or other storage devices. The RF unit 130 and 230 can include baseband circuits to process radio signals. If the exemplary embodiments are implemented in the form of software, the methods (steps, functions, etc.) which will be described in this disclosure can be implemented as modules. The modules can be stored in the memory 120 and 220, and can be executed by the control unit 110 and 210.

Network Entry and Initialization

FIG. 3 shows a flow chart illustrating network entry procedures and initialization procedures in the wireless communication system.

Referring to FIG. 3, the mobile station 100 searches a base station by scanning for a downlink channel, and the mobile station 100 obtains system information on downlink and uplink (S10).

Then, the mobile station 100 performs a ranging process with the base station which has been searched (S20). The ranging process enables the mobile station 100 to get synchronized with the uplink through the contention-based ranging, where the mobile station 100 selects a randomly selected CDMA ranging code and transmits it to the base station 200.

The base station 200 informs adjustment information for the mobile station via a ranging response message (RNG-RSP). During the adjustment the status of the ranging response message is configured as 'continue,' and after the adjustment the base station 200 transmits the ranging response message indicating the status is configured as 'success.'

The RNG-RSP message, which is transferred from the base station 200 to the mobile station, includes power offset information, timing offset information and frequency offset information of the mobile station 100. The mobile station 100 transmits data to the base station 200 based on the information afterwards.

When the mobile station 100 indicates that the ranging request by the ranging code is processed successfully, the mobile station 100 transmits a ranging request (RNG-REQ) message to the base station 200 (S21) and the base station 200 transmits RNG-RSP to the mobile station 100 in response to the RNG-REQ (S22).

When the mobile station 100 receives the RNG-RSP, the mobile station 100 transmits, to the base station 200, Subscriber Station Basic Capability Request (SBC-REQ) message, which includes information on parameters and authentication methods which the mobile station supports for the data receiving and transmission with the base station (S30).

Upon receiving the SBC-REQ message, the mobile station 200 compares the parameters and authentication methods in the SBC-REQ message with the parameters and authentication methods that the base station 200 supports. According to results of the comparison, the base station 200 determines the parameters and the authentication method that the mobile station 100 will use for the data communication with the base station 200, and transmits Subscriber Station Basic Capability Response (SBC-RSP) message to the mobile station 100 including the determined parameters and the determined authentication method (S40).

After completion of the basic capability negotiation with the base station **200**, the mobile station **100** starts authentication procedure (**S50**). During the authentication procedure, the mobile station **100** and the base station **200** mutually authenticate each other, and exchange security keys which will be used for protected data transmission afterwards.

Thereafter, the mobile station **100** enters into the registration procedure with the base station **200** by transmitting Registration Request (REG-REQ) message (**S61**) and by receiving Registration Response (REG-RSP) message (**S62**).

Once the registration procedure is completed, the mobile station **100** establishes IP connectivity and transfers operational parameters. After completion of the network entry procedures and the initialization procedures described above, the connection between the mobile station **100** and the base station **200** is established.

Machine to Machine: M2M

Machine-to-Machine (M2M) refers to technologies that allow both wireless and wired systems to communicate with other devices of the same ability. Thus, M2M communication indicates a wired and wireless communication between devices rather than a general communication between a device controlled by user and other device. Also, M2M devices used in cellular network lacks performance or capability when compared to general devices.

M2M communication environments have different characteristics than traditional communication environments, such as a large number of devices in a cell, low data traffic, less frequent data transmission, limited number of data characteristics, insensitive to time delay, etc. M2M devices are, for example, a vending machine, a fixed metering machine and a fixed surveillance video. A large number of devices in a cell can be categorized by device type, class, service type, etc. M2M devices can have the following features depending on the services they support:

1. M2M devices transmit data less frequently. Data can be periodically transmitted.
2. M2M devices have a low mobility or are stationary.
3. M2M devices are less sensitive generally towards latency in signal transmission.

Many M2M devices showing the above features can communicate with each other or even with the base station using multi-hop configuration or hierarchical structure.

Terms for M2M system are as follows:

(1) Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication: Information exchange between user devices through a Base Station, or between a device and a server in the core network through a Base Station, that may be carried out without any human interaction.

(2) M2M ASN: An Access Service Network that supports M2M service.

(3) M2M device: An MS that is capable of providing M2M communication.

(4) M2M Server: An entity that communicates with M2M devices. The M2M server runs M2M applications and provides M2M specific services for one or more M2M devices.

(5) M2M feature: A unique characteristic of an M2M application. One or more features may be needed to support an application.

(6) M2M device group: A group of M2M devices that share one or more features in common.

M2M Device Group ID (MGID) and MGID Assignment

In a wireless system supporting M2M communication, a first identifier and a second identifier are assigned to each M2M device. The first identifier is used to identify the M2M Device Group that the M2M device belongs to in a cell, and

the second identifier is used to uniquely identify the M2M device among devices in the M2M Device Group.

The first identifier is referred to as M2M Device Group ID (MGID) or Primary M2M Device ID, and the second identifier is referred to as M2M Device ID (MDID) or Secondary M2M Device ID.

A M2M communication support system assigns MGM Group ID and M2M Device ID to the M2M devices during the initial network entry procedure. The M2M communication system can be the base station or a network entity connected to the networks. The network entity can be M2M server.

FIG. 4 is an exemplary diagram illustrating relationship between M2M Device Group ID and M2M Device ID.

Referring to FIG. 4, M2M Device Group IDs (MGIDs) from 1 to N are assigned to each M2M device group, and each M2M Device Group includes M2M device IDs (MDIDs).

MGID Assignment

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary method for assigning an M2M Device Group ID and an M2M Device ID to a M2M device during the network entry procedure.

The steps **S110**, **S121**, **S122**, **S140**, **S150** and **S161** in FIG. 5 corresponds respectively to the steps **S10**, **S21**, **S22**, **S40**, **S50** and **S61** in FIG. 3. The corresponding steps have already been described above, thus other steps will be described with reference to FIG. 5.

During the basic capability negotiation of the initial network entry procedure, the mobile station **100** transmits, to the base station **200**, an SBC-REQ message including information that the mobile station **100** is an M2M device or has an M2M capability (**S130**). For example, the mobile station **100** can set M2M capability field as '1' in the SBC-REQ message.

The base station **200**, which has received the SBC-REQ including the information, notices that the mobile station **100** is an M2M device and assigns M2M Device Group ID and M2M Device ID for the mobile station.

The base station **200** transmits, to the mobile station **100**, a REG-RSP message including the M2M Device Group ID and the M2M Device ID (**S162**).

As described above, the base station **200** notices that the mobile station **100** is an M2M device through the M2M capability field set as '1' in the SBC-REQ message, and assigns an M2M Device Group ID and an M2M Device ID for the mobile station **100** via the REG-RSP message.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of a process for decrypting multicast data of a mobile station.

Referring to FIG. 6, the mobile station **100**, which belongs to a certain M2M Device Group, enters into a network entry procedure (**S100**) as the mobile station **100** approaches a cell of the base station **200**. After completion of the network entry (**S100**) and a key derivation (**S400**) in FIG. 6, the mobile station **100** can successfully decrypt the multicast data for the devices in the M2M Device Group using the traffic encryption key generated by the key derivation (**S400**).

The mobile station **100** performs the network entry procedure (**S100**). The step **S100** corresponds to the steps of **S10** through **S62** in FIG. 3, or the steps of **S110** through **S162** in FIG. 5.

The base station **200** can perform additional signaling with M2M Server **300** or AAA server **400** if necessary (**S200**).

The base station **200** can exchange messages for device authentication with AAA server **400** (**S210**).

Also, the base station **200** can obtain MAK (M2M service Authorization Key) for the mobile station **100** (**S220**). The MAK is generated by network side and is provided to all authorized M2M devices. The MAK can be used as an authorization key for the M2M Device Group, which works as a group master key or GMK. In some examples, the base station

can locally generate the MAK for cell specific group security management, where the MAK is unique only within the base station. In some examples, the base station can request a cell common MAK from the M2M server 300 for cell common group security management (S230), where the MAK is unique within the entire network or multiple cells.

After the mobile station 100 is authorized and authenticated, the mobile station can perform a group join procedure. If the mobile station 100 is accepted to join a group, the base station informs the device of an identifier of the M2M Device Group, i.e. the M2M Device Group ID (MGID) (S310).

Then, the base station 200 transmits security parameters to the mobile station 100 (S320). The security parameters are used for generating a traffic encryption key. The security parameters include the MAK, a group security seed and a counter.

The group security seed can be a random value generated by network side, which can be called M2M service Group Security Seed or MGSS and provided through DSA procedure.

Also, the counter can be an index of the currently used traffic encryption key. The counter can be expressed as M2MGTEK_COUNT. The counter is used as one of parameters for the key derivation function, thus the update of the traffic encryption key depends on the counter.

Then, the mobile station 100 performs a key derivation function to generate the traffic encryption key based on the MGID, the MAK, the group security seed and the counter (S410). The traffic encryption key will be used for encrypting multicast data to be transferred to the devices in the M2M Device Group. The traffic encryption key can be referred as M2M service Group Traffic Encryption Key or MGTEK. The step of performing the key derivation function (S410) relates to the key hierarchy for the MGTEK shown in FIG. 7. Referring to FIG. 7, the M2M Authorization Key or MAK (10) is generated by network side and the security parameters (20) such as MGID, MAK, MGSS and M2MGTEK_COUNT are obtained from the base station 200. The key derivation function (30) derives the traffic encryption key or MGTEK using the MAK, and the parameters (20). The key derivation function (30) is one of pseudo random functions designed to generate the same cryptographic key on both sides when they give the same input values. The key derivation function (30) used for the techniques described in this disclosure can be 'Dot16KDF' as shown below and in FIG. 7.

$$\text{M2MGTEK} \leftarrow \text{Dot16KDF}(\text{MAK}, \text{MGSS} \parallel \text{M2MGTEK_COUNT} \parallel \text{MGID} \parallel \text{"M2MGTEK"}, 128) \quad [\text{Equation 1}]$$

Then, the mobile station 100 can acknowledge the acquisition of the traffic encryption key towards the base station 200 (S420). The base station 200 can check whether MGTEK is properly generated on the mobile station side and/or on the base station side (S430).

Then, the base station 200 can transmit multicast traffic data encrypted using the MGTEK (S500). For any group related data transmission, the base station 200 can use the MGTEK, which can require additional features such as group SAID (Security Association) ID mapping. For example, the base station 200 can combine device specific security with Group security application using MGTEK.

Meanwhile, the mobile station 100 receives encrypted multicast data from the base station 200. The mobile station 100 decrypts the encrypted multicast data received from the base station 200 using the group traffic key generated.

FIG. 8 shows a flow chart of a process for providing L2 Group Security. The steps having the same reference numeral in FIG. 8 are same as the corresponding steps in FIG. 6.

Referring to FIG. 8, the base station or the mobile device does not have to take any actions to set up the M2M Device Group security functions. All security measures are done through L3. The base station can request for a group formation (S240), and the AAA server 400 generates all necessary keys (S250) and transmits via the base station. Encryption of multicast data is also done at server side (S520). The base station only forwards the multi-cast packets.

Updating Group Traffic Key

FIG. 9, FIG. 10 and FIG. 11 illustrate exemplary processes for updating the group traffic key.

The traffic encryption key for a certain M2M Device Group can be updated using one or more of the security parameters for the key derivation function. If the base station can inform the mobile station of which parameter(s) are changed through a trigger message, the mobile station can derive the update traffic key again.

Referring to FIG. 9, while the base station transmits encrypted data using the traffic key (S500), an event which leads a change in one or more of security parameters can happen (S610). Then, the base station 200 transmits a trigger message including the changed parameter(s) to the mobile station (S620).

Then, the mobile station 100 performs the key derivation function to update the MGTEK using the parameters received through the trigger message (S630).

After successful update of the MGTEK, the mobile station 100 can receive and decrypt the multicast data using the group traffic key updated (S700).

Type of Event

In various examples, the event causing the change in one or more of security parameters can be an exhaustion of PN space, an expiry of MGTEK/MAK lifetime or a mismatch detection of EKS or M2MGTEK_COUNT.

In one example, the changed security parameters to be included in the trigger message include the authorization key, i.e. MAK, which has been newly derived in the network. This event can happen the MAK lifetime is expired. The M2MGTEK is updated either upon the expiration of PN space or the M2MGTEK lifetime, whichever comes first. In case the PN space expires or the M2MGTEK lifetime, the current M2MGTEK_COUNT increments by one by which the devices perform local derivation to generate the new M2MGTEK.

In one example, the changed security parameters to be included in the trigger message include the group security seed, i.e. MGSS. The group security seed can be changed when other device is unsubscribed from the M2M Device Group where the mobile device belongs. If a device cancels subscription from a group, a newly generated MGSS is provided to each mobile station in the group via the unsolicited PKM-RSP message and the base station initializes the M2MGTEK_COUNT. The MGSS value can be encrypted within the PKM-RSP message. The base station excludes the unsubscribed device from such security context update. For mobile stations in connected mode, the base station transmits the new security context via the unsolicited PKM-RSP message. For mobile stations in idle mode, the base station pages the entire group (i.e., MGID) via the MOB_PAG-ADV message with 'Action Code' set to 0b10. For each mobile station that successfully performed network re-entry, the ABS transmits an unsolicited PKM-RSP message including the new MGSS.

In one example, the changed security parameters to be included in the trigger message include the counter, i.e. M2MGTEK_COUNT, which has been incremented by 1. In this example, the traffic key update based on

M2MGTEK_COUNT as seed for generating the new updated MGTEK. The M2MGTEK_COUNT can be transmitted clearly since MGTEK is not exposed. This event can happen the PN space is exhausted.

In one example, the mobile station can detect whether the traffic key has been changed or not. Referring to FIG. 11, if the base station transmits multicast data with the updated

In one example, if the mobile station is in idle mode, the base station can use Paging Advertisement message as a trigger message. Referring to FIG. 10, the base station transmits a paging advertisement message as a trigger message including the updated M2MGTEK_COUNT to inform the mobile station (S620 in FIG. 10). The paging advertisement message for informing the updated parameters can be MOB_PAG-ADV message as shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Syntax	Size (bit)	Notes
...		
Action Code	2	Paging action instruction to MS 0b00 = No action required 0b01 = Perform ranging to establish location and acknowledge message 0b10 = Enter network 0b11 = Receiving Multi cast traffic
If (Action Code == 0b11) {		
Multi-cast security key update	1	0: no update on multi-cast security key 1: Multi-cast security key update scheduled
Multi-cast Group ID (MGID)	15	The multi-cast group ID, which the multi-cast traffic is scheduled for
If Multi-cast security key update=1 {		
M2MGTEK_COUNT	TBD	The change count of the M2MGTEK, which is to be updated
Update_time	TBD	This indicates the time offset of when the updated M2MGTEK will be applied for multi-cast traffic
MGSS	TBD	Randomly generated value by BS
}		
Multicast transmission start time (MTST)	TBD	Least significant TBD bits of the frame number in which the ABS starts sending DL multicast data. Shall be present when the MTST needs to be included in this message.
}		
...		

traffic key (S650), the mobile station detects whether the multicast data is decrypted using the old traffic key, by checking Encryption Key Sequence or EKS (S660). If the mobile station is not able to decrypt multicast data (S660), the mobile station initiate a key update request by transmitting the PKM-REQ message to the base station (S670). The base station transmits respond with the current MGSS and the M2MGTEK_COUNT that are in use via the PKM-RSP message (S680). Table 1 shows PKM attributes of PKM-REQ/RSP message.

TABLE 1

Type	PKM attribute
...	...
47	GKEK-Parameters
48	MIH Cycle
49	MIH Delivery Method and Status Code
53	M2M Multi-cast SAdescriptor
54	M2MGTEK -Parameters
55-255	Reserved

Type of Trigger Message

Also, in various examples, the trigger message informing the mobile station of the change in one or more of security parameters can be a MAC message or a paging advertisement message.

In one example, if the mobile station is in the state of connected (active), the base station can use MAC message as a trigger message. Referring to FIG. 9, the base station transmits multicast message to inform the updated parameters (S620 in FIG. 9). The MAC message to be used as a trigger message is not limited thereto.

Direct Informing

Compare to the previously described examples, the base station 200 can inform the mobile station 100 of the updated traffic key (MGTEK).

Referring to FIG. 12, the base station 200 can detect whether the traffic key or the security parameters have been changed (S810).

The base station 200 can transmit a paging advertisement message to inform all idle device of scheduled MGTEK update (S820). Also, the base station 200 can set the activation time related to the scheduled MGTEK update. The base station 200 transmits multicast data encrypted with the original MGTEK until the activation time (S830). The multicast data can have information on the new MGTEK to be updated and the activation time set.

The mobile station 100 updates and uses MGTEK until the activation time (S840), (S850). After the activation time, the base station starts transmitting the multicast data encrypted with the MGTEK (S860, S870).

The aforementioned embodiments are achieved by combination of structural elements and features of the present invention in a predetermined type. Each of the structural elements or features should be considered selectively unless specified separately. Each of the structural elements or features may be carried out without being combined with other structural elements or features. Also, some structural elements and/or features may be combined with one another to constitute the embodiments of the present invention. The order of operations described in the embodiments of the present invention may be changed. Some structural elements or features of one embodiment may be included in another embodiment, or may be replaced with corresponding structural elements or features of another embodiment. Moreover,

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it will be apparent that some claims referring to specific claims may be combined with another claims referring to the other claims other than the specific claims to constitute the embodiment or add new claims by means of amendment after the application is filed.

The embodiments of the present invention have been described based on the data transmission and reception between the mobile station and the base station. A specific operation which has been described as being performed by the base station may be performed by an upper node of the base station as the case may be. In other words, it will be apparent that various operations performed for communication with the user equipment in the network which includes a plurality of network nodes along with the base station can be performed by the base station or network nodes other than the base station. The base station may be replaced with terms such as a fixed station, Node B, eNode B (eNB), and access point. The mobile station may be replaced with terms such as user equipment (UE) and mobile subscriber station (MSS).

The embodiments according to the present invention can be implemented by various means, for example, hardware, firmware, software, or their combination. If the embodiment according to the present invention is implemented by hardware, the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented by one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), processors, controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, etc.

If the embodiment according to the present invention is implemented by firmware or software, the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented by a type of a module, a procedure, or a function, which performs functions or operations described as above. A software code may be stored in a memory unit and then may be driven by a processor. The memory unit may be located inside or outside the processor to transmit and receive data to and from the processor through various means which are well known.

It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the present invention can be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit and essential characteristics of the invention. Thus, the above embodiments are to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention should be determined by reasonable interpretation of the appended claims and all change which comes within the equivalent scope of the invention are included in the scope of the invention.

The invention claimed is:

1. A method for decrypting multicast data by a mobile station in a wireless communication system, the method comprising:

receiving an identifier of a group from a base station;
receiving parameters for generating a group traffic encryption key from the base station, wherein the parameters include an authentication key for the group, a group security seed for the group and a counter for the group traffic encryption key;
performing a key derivation function to generate the group traffic encryption key based on the identifier and the parameters; and

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decrypting multicast data using the group traffic encryption key,

wherein, when another mobile station unsubscribes from the group, the method further comprises:

receiving a trigger message for updating the group traffic encryption key from the base station,

wherein the trigger message includes a new group security seed and an initialized counter;

performing the key derivation function to update the group traffic encryption key based on the new group security seed and the initialized counter in the trigger message; and

decrypting the multicast data using the updated group traffic encryption key.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the trigger message further includes the authentication key derived based on the new group security seed.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the identifier of the group is a M2M (Machine to Machine) device group identifier.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising:
transmitting, to the base station, control information indicating that M2M capability is enabled.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the control information is transmitted during a capability negotiation procedure with the base station.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the group is a machine to machine (M2M) multicast group.

7. A mobile station configured to decrypt multicast data in a wireless communication system, the mobile station comprising:

a transmit/receive device; and

a processor operatively connected to the transmit/receive device and configured to:

receive an identifier of a group from a base station;
receive parameters for generating a group traffic encryption key from the base station,

wherein the parameters include an authentication key for the group, a group security seed for the group and a counter for the group traffic encryption key;

perform a key derivation function to generate the group traffic encryption key based on the identifier and the parameters; and

decrypt multicast data using the group traffic encryption key,

wherein, when another mobile station unsubscribes from the group, the processor is further configured to:

receive a trigger message for updating the group traffic encryption key from the base station, wherein the trigger message includes a new group security seed and an initialized counter;

perform the key derivation function to update the group traffic encryption key based on the new group security seed and the initialized counter in the trigger message; and

decrypt the multicast data using the updated group traffic encryption key.

8. The mobile station of claim 7, wherein the group is a machine to machine (M2M) multicast group.

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